Richard W. Burgess and Michael Kulikowski's A Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre from its Origins to the High Middle Ages (Volume I in the authors' planned series Mosaics of Time: The Latin Chronicle Traditions from the First Century BC to the Sixth Century AD)
posits that medieval studies has neglected to engage in a systematic, historically-informed reflection on the genre of chronicles. The present article asserts that this challenge to the field presents a unique opportunity for an interdisciplinary discussion of wide scope and lasting duration. I thus argue that Burgess and Kulikowski's larger points may be reconciled with current scholarship on medieval chronicles by updating the theoretical premises that underlie our identification of historical genres. I aim to contribute to the discussion by turning to a consensus in current theoretical work, that genre is best discussed as a description of the way texts and their readers communicated. The article concludes by applying this hypothesis to an experiment in comparison: if it is not the differences but the similarities that stand out when Cicero and Isidore of Seville's respective meditations upon chronicles are set side by side, then what are the implications for our methods of reconstructing the significance of chronicles in their own milieus?
Why we need an account of the ›chronicle genre‹ As regards historical writings, while medievalists have indeed sought to disassociate ›chronicle‹ from ›history‹, the Middle Ages remain that period which saw the dominance of the medieval version of history-writing -chronicles -over proper histories. Medievalists do assert and remind each other that chronicles are not histories. Nevertheless, without a clear articulation of what chronicles did, even we struggle to apply the principle, still finding ourselves in tautological discussions that begin and end with the notion that chronicles really are not very good histories, and still fighting the looming spectre of anachronism: why did the Middle Ages not do things better?
There is no question that important studies have been marching us steadily towards better appreciation and understanding of late antique or early medieval Latin and Greek chronicles in se. However, chronicles primarily receive resuscitation on an individual basis, one-at-atime. Our improved readings have not yet written out how we might disentangle chronicles, as a body of literature, from the history of histories. We need a method of reading that crosses the late antique and early medieval, crosses between east and west, and provides us with a good notion of what it is -what it is exactly -that chronicles, as a genre, do and did with time, at different times. How did chronicles make meaning? It is with this perspective that I turn to A Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre for a coherent »chronicle genre« distinct from the history of history-writing, for chronicles not as An (unfortunate) Way Medievals Wrote History, but as nothing more nor less than chronicles.
How now, an answer? The argument of a historical introduction to the chronicle genre
A Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre certainly moves the discussion towards this end. Richard W. Burgess and Michael Kulikowski (hereafter RB and MK) insist that chronicles are unique, meaningful, have a long and very respectable literary pedigree, and as a genre, a socio-political role in their communities. RB and MK's treatment of chronicles crosses both the east-west (i.e., Latin-Greek) and the ancient-medieval divides. They challenge medievalists to take into account the ancient formulation of the genre, and challenge classicists to both accord the genre its place in classical literature, and to more fully account for ancient chronicles' medieval afterlives and transmission:
The first Latin chronicles, as we have seen, were the product of Rome's highest intellectual circles. They were written, read, and enjoyed by the intellectual and literary giants of the time. … Chronicles were not to be judged against Livy or Tacitus, nor even against Florus or Eutropius, and we ought not to do so either. Chronicles are what they are, and must be judged on that basis, not in comparison with anything else.
Traditions« but on »The Chronicle Genre«. Accordingly, Chapter One (»Early Chronicles«) establishes the genre ›historically‹, meaning the first texts that constitute proper, or true, chronicles are identified in time and place, and their characteristics constitute RB and MK's definition of the genre ex origines. The phrase that RB and MK most often use to distinguish texts with these proper (or full) characteristics is ›True‹ or ›Ancient Greek Chronicle‹. In sum, I would distinguish two arguments made by RB and MK's Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre. The first is their new hypothesis: the chronicle genre had a continuous millennium of importance, and even influence, from ca. 5/400 BC: a much richer story than either ancient or medieval historical and literary scholars have heretofore acknowledged. This provocative longer history of chronicle-writing certainly convinces me that scholarship on the reading and writing of medieval chronicles has something to gain by considering how Demetrius of Phaleron, Phlegon of Tralles, and Atticus created and transmitted an ancient way of thinking.
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The second argument, however, challenges a premise held by medievalists in general. RB and MK insist that the set of characteristics scholars indicate with the term »chronicle« should not be defined by the (more numerous) medieval texts to which we might assign the title, but instead »chronicle« should be reserved for texts with the (more originary) ancient characteristics: post-seventh-century texts should not be entitled »chronicle«. The remainder of this essay engages with the terms of this sustained argument (as set out in Chapter One and applied in Chapter Six), by which the authors seek to identify exactly when the True or Ancient Greek Chronicle disappeared from Greek and Latin literature.
I argue, contra RB and MK, that we must not relinquish the ›medieval chronicle‹. On the one hand, the idea is impractical. Only a terminological dictatorship could stop ›annal‹ and ›chronicle‹ from being used to rather casually encompass a variety of historical writings across the millenium of the ›Middle Ages‹ (as in G. Dumphy's Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle). On the other hand, one compelled by the spirit of RB and MK's argument for terminological sensitivity (as I am), could still extend the story of the chronicle-writing tradition through other means than raising up definitive ancient examples to the denigration of the medieval or Byzantine.
11 I propose instead to adopt RB and MK's account of the ancient tradition, but to extract the premise that one set of specific characteristics, based on certain formative texts from the ancient (Greek-speaking) world, is what »chronicle« was. I propose to do this by challenging RB and MK's idea of genre, and by proposing an alternative to their reading of the key phrase in Cicero's Brutus -in uno conspectu. Making it impossible for classicists to dismiss ancient chronicles, and encouraging medievalists to incorporate Cicero's analyses are desiderata, but to achieve these ends RB and MK have approached the passage from Brutus with a definition of genre whereby originary characteristics are definitive, and are the standards to which later works must aspire. That is, RB and MK's view holds a genre's ontology to be contingent (the ›chronicle‹ has come into being), but maintains that the species can only ever slightly evolve before distinction becomes significant difference. This approach to genre maintains analytic clarity at the expense of preserving the terms authors and readers in the past chose for themselves. 17 Before Turning to the already-mentioned passage from the beginning of Cicero's Brutus, we find that in context Cicero's character was not providing a literary taxonomy of »the chronicle«, but answering a specific question from Atticus about the effect of, specifically, his own chronicle. As the dialogue gets under way, we find the three friends in question -Cicero, Atticus, and Brutus -discussing the letters they had recently exchanged. Cicero soon turns his attention to the chronicle that Atticus sent with his letter. The interlocutor, Brutus, notes that Cicero had been mired in despair and asserts that the effect of Atticus' Chronicle upon Cicero -of delight (delectatio) -is unique. Cicero agrees but clarifies that the work was a delight insofar as it provided the restoration of his salus. Reading Atticus' Chronicle brought about salus (›well-being‹) by, as Cicero's dramatis persona states, lifting his spirits out of a particular kind of sickness -a political despondency, or a depression about the state of the Republic. This healing did indeed delight Cicero, but the point that the dialogue emphasizes is that Atticus' chronicle saved Cicero from his despair.
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Upon having his work so roundly praised, Atticus asked Cicero to explain these positive effects via a summative question, a ›reading‹ of the dialogue thus far.
… sed quid tandem habuit liber iste, quod tibi aut novum aut tanto usui posset esse?
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(… but what could that book hold, that could possibly be to you either new, or so useful?)
Cicero could have refuted Atticus, and insisted upon the idea of ›delight‹, but instead he agreed with the author's supposition: newness and usefulness were the chronicle's significant attributes:
Ille vero et nova … mihi quidem multa et eam utilitatem quam requirebam, ut explicatis ordinibus temporum uno in conspectu omnia viderem.
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(Indeed it certainly [provided] both many things new to me, and this use which I required: the order of times having been explicated, I could see all in one comprehensive view.)
Here, then, is the phrase so important to RB and MK's generic history, but it follows Atticus' query as to whether the Chronicle had confronted Cicero with something new and useful. Cicero strongly affirmed the idea by retaining Atticus' binary structure in his response (his »et … et« corresponds to Atticus' »aut … aut«), verifying that the proposal was accurate: the chronicle had provided something new and useful, in restoring well-being.
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It seems inappropriate to excerpt a definition from any one portion of this exchange, or especially to neglect any of the effects that Cicero emphasized throughout the imagined discussion.
24 Instead, I would sum up the dialogue's prognosis of the connection between Atticus' Chronicle and Cicero's mood as follows. Atticus' Chronicle presented everything in its ordained temporal place and in a single scope: a new way of seeing old information. This presentation proved useful, alleviating despondence over the state of the world; the experience of the cure brought delight. Newness, well-being, delight, and usefulness: all had to do with each other, and all came into play in the encounter between one reader and Atticus' chronicle at a specific historical moment. Atticus had not asked what was ›new or useful‹ about chronicles in general, but what had been useful and new for Cicero. Cicero had needed a remedy that would lift his spirits, and the chronicle had conveyed just that: a new perspective on the world. For RB and MK, Cicero's »delight« derived from the ludic possibilities enabled by the chronicle's presentation of the past, a presentation which facilitated a kind of »play« with information; 25 while not denying that this idea is present to a degree, in my reading (by contrast) Brutus emphasized how Atticus' Chronicle had directly and precisely matched a particular need, usefully saving Cicero from despair. The »delight« Cicero had experienced was not posited as a universal effect of seeing things in uno conspectu, but was linked with the experience of a pleasant remedy, or cure, for political malaise. Brutus presented Atticus' chronicle as a text that incited readers to rethink their world, to rethink time, to confront old things in a new light, to surprise, shock, even reveal.
My more ›subjective‹ reading of Cicero's comments is rooted in an approach to genre that incorporates function and audience into its description. In what follows I would like to identify how my contextualized reading of the Brutus passage is in dialogue with a now well-established »turn« in genre theory concerned with ascertaining how texts work in dialogue with their readers. That is, current genre theory encourages us in the same direction as this reading of Brutus: the effect on particular readers in specific situations has to be a part of what makes any chronicle, a chronicle. History, Theory, Research, and Pedagogy (2012) . I limit myself to these introduction-level anglophone texts in order to illustrate that despite differences between these authors' interests (connecting semiotics and film; historicizing genre criticism; formulating genre as textual cues to readers; teaching genre as writing), they present a remarkably stable consensus from within the field on the parameters within which analysis of genre now takes place. As applies to the topic at hand, Daniel Chandler's An Introduction to Genre Theory (1997, updated 2000) , pointed out problems with the same ›traditional‹ approach to genre which seems to characterize RB and MK's taxonomy of the chronicle. This »approach sees genres as ›true‹ in some sense, but in doing so it falls prey to the ›empiricist's dilemma‹«. 26 The dilemma appears in A Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre when, in order to identify the characteristics of ›chronicles‹, RB and MK isolate the texts that are chronicles on the basis of the characteristics that make them ›chronicles‹: these texts are chronicles, and ›chronicles‹ are these texts.
Chandler's alternative approach points to Reader Response Theory: »if we are studying the way in which genre frames the reader's interpretation of a text then we would do well to focus on how readers identify genres rather than on theoretical distinctions.« 27 Chandler goes on to assert that not only must we incorporate the responses of readers when we discuss genre, readers must be the ones who ultimately define the genres. 28 In other words: »one way of defining genres is as ›a set of expectations‹«, which regulate the »desire, memory and expectation« of the reader. 29 Thus, »genres are not simply features of texts, but are mediating frameworks between texts, makers and interpreters.« 30 Chandler gives us ›genre‹ as a dynamic, oft-changing »intertextual concept«, 31 a phenomenon of time and place which concerns readers' encounters with texts more than texts in se.
To understand how the field arrived at the idea that »genres need to be studied as historical phenomena,« we might turn to David Duff's collection Modern Genre Theory (2000).
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What Chandler criticized as a »traditionalist« approach, Duff more precisely labels a »for-malist« or »taxonomic« approach to genre which saw an ontology in generic categories, and which subsumed textual items as either »members« or outliers of these generic categories. In sum: over the course of the last half century, critical work on genre has come to hold that to describe genre is to identify the particular way texts and audiences worked with and upon each other to create and modify patterns of reading. This consensus is perhaps put most succinctly by Frow' 53 Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, [18] [19] 54 See the discussion of Cassiodorus' Consularia exhibiting enough characteristics of both »chronicle« and »consula-ria« to be both at the same time on Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, [42] [43] 55 Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, 199 and 33. 56 Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, [199] [200] . Emphasis by the author. Isidore's ideology was »rather more Byzantine and medieval« than Eusebius' Chronological Canons with »an emphasis on the majesty of the ruler and the necessity of obedience to him«, Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, 199. 57 See RB and MK's brilliant passage beginning with: »The reader is still required to pick out and isolate the narrative … the work is done by the reader,« Burgess and Kulikowski, Historical Introduction, 24. to identify what the text communicated without paying careful attention to framing, order, and the context of particular discussions; we must embrace the Etymologiae's spectacular web of associative meanings, its tapestries of form and content. Thus we must first note that in the Etymologiae, we find that Isidore physically separated his discussion of texts governed by »narrative« (narratio) from his discussion of chronica, setting the former in Book I, the latter in Book V. Isidore's comments on narrative texts -»On Grammar« -concluded the first part of the Etymologiae's tripartite opening discourse on the trivium (a book was devoted to each of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectic) with his explication of historia. To set up the concept's etymology, Isidore worked through the interplay between form and method. Historia was first an over-arching genre denoting all narrative accounts of past occurrences: »a narratio of deeds accomplished; through it what occurred in the past is sorted out.« 61 Isidore did not leave his discussion here (with historia indistinguishable from annales, for instance), but clarified historia's uniqueness through a further, methodological, distinction: how did works called historia »sort out« the past? From what sorts of things would an author construct and compose historiae? Historia (like annales) worked in years, but (unlike annales), a historia was constructed with a much more reliable epistemology: investigation of things seen. 62 Having conjured up both form and method in his reader's mind, Isidore provided the central idea of historia:
Historia is so called from the Greek term ἱστορεῖν, that is, from ›seeing‹ or from ›kno-wing‹ … we grasp with our eyes things that occur better than what we gather from our hearing, since what is seen is revealed without falsehood. 62 I have already noted RB and MK's directive to medievalists: cease using the term »annals« (n. 11, above). Isidore's distinction here is a counterpoint, though RB and MK are not the first to elide Isidore's comparisons between »historia«, »annales«, and »chronica« (see : Deliyannis, Introduction, [3] [4] [5] [6] . And then Isidore again emphasized the point, this time with a comparison:
Historia is of those times that we have seen, but annals are of those years that our age has not known.
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Annales concerned themselves with the remote past and so had to be constructed using written records only. Historia worked with living memory. Historia alone both worked in the greatest unit of time (years), and relied on living memory to construct its account.
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By implication, if Isidore thought a narrative of the »six ages« governed chronica's logic, he would have categorized it under historia as a kind of annales, but Isidore did not. Instead, Isidore read chronica -still awaiting the reader to arrive in Book V, »On Laws and Times« -to be ordered by a different rationale. What was that rationale? What was the form and the epistemology of a chronica? What did a chronica do? Isidore would brook no whiff of narratio in his explanation. Isidore's opening asserted that writing a chronica was primarily a kind of organization of the reckoning and periodization of time itself, an ordering of »the succession of times« (series temporum).
66 Isidore explained that »times«, here, denoted all measured lengths: from moments and hours, days and nights, to weeks, months, solstices, equinoxes, seasons, years, Olympiads, Jubilees, and finally to periods and ages (saecula et aetates). 67 We must thus understand the abbreviated version of Isidore's own Chronica -the »epitome« provided at the end of Book V -as fulfilling these explanations: the division of time into ages stood upon the ordering of time from moment to moment. A chronica was not an account of the past, but the result of an organization, an ordering, of time itself.
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As Henderson points out, we must also bear in mind that -in the only such instance in the entire work -Isidore's reader was not told what »chronica« meant: his »epitome« of the Chronica replaced the expected etymology. Henderson guesses why: »This block of writing will consist of nothing but origins, since its dates all tell where a piece of the cultural encyclopedia came from, in telling us when it entered the archive.« 69 In other words: the »chro-nicle epitome« is the etymology, for Chronica provides the »etymology« for etymology itself. For Isidore, Chronica is the originary origin story. Chronica establishes the past into which narrative writes.
If we recall Isidore's discussion of the division of time -from »second« to »age« -we might note that Isidore begins with the quantifiably measurable, and ends with the cultural-political: from »moment« to »historical period«. Is this not evidence for RB and MK's position, that Isidore snuck narrative into time's structure? No, for by engaging directly with the implicit narrative of the idea of »ages«, the Etymologiae unpacked an argument that sought to liberate time from the political, even as it pointed out the politics implicit in any reckoning of time. As Henderson shows, Isidore noted that Augustus Caesar had created the notion of an age, an epoch (»era«) through a census that established itself as both date and fiscal deadline: »[Augustus] designated and dated his first tax assessment (census) as the year dot, for, in this epoch-making moment, legally/legibly ›writing the Roman world‹ meant ›the whole world contributing its earnings [aera] to the exchequer‹ -hence the term ›era‹ [aes] (5.36.4).« 70 Isidore's march through a chronographer's calculations proceeded unblinkingly from »ma-terial« to »political« reckoning. And not just any political, but the pan-cultural Mediterranean past of Roman Imperium. Isidore exposed the great temporal concept -the »age« -as a homogenization of politics and past. This was an established fact, but Isidore wanted to say something yet more explicit. Again, I quote from Henderson's rendering of Isidore's critique:
Here is the point where Time must stand up to be counted, big time: aetas is indeed a concept, for this complex term homologizes, for a start, (its own) 3 dimensions, and then runs on, exponentially, ad infinitum -for »age« starts as the truly-reckoned lifespan of human, becomes humankind's reckoning of its »Ages«, but in its encompassing flexibility will then come to be eternity, where actual reckoning, and the story that is reckoned, come to the same thing.
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Isidore's reading of his own Chronica is on the same plane as the Ciceronian injunction we earlier proposed: to reveal time and so the world, anew. Time is not story, but it is a sort of writing. The Etymologiae proved that time is the writing of universe as law is the writing of society, that the reckoning of time »homologizes.« »Time, in this strange iconic writing stakes out, and narrates, the first six stages of human history in a distinctive idiom all of its own.« 72 That is, the textual logic (graphos) of a chronica was the order of events in time (chronos). Why, then, did Isidore epitomize time into Christian ages if his true focus was the reckoning of time in se? Isidore's analysis and epitome laboured to show just how much the reckoning of time was, and is, political. The insight of the Chronica into the nature of reckoned or calculated time -»There is no record without regnum« 73 -was a fundamentally postAugustan insight insofar as it was an insight that (chronologically speaking) Atticus could not have had: Augustus' imperious »homologizing« of time and empire had not yet occurred. Nevertheless, this does not, in my reading, taint it as a non-chronicle. Isidore's lesson, his Chronica's revelation, was that eternity (Henderson's »big time,« or time-as-such), would outshine empire (reckoned time). Reckoned time may be governed by empire and regnum, but big time »will out« (Henderson) in the literal sense that reckoned time will end, but big time -›eternity‹ -will be. Conclusion: And if a work of art has no effect? Titles, and genres, and reading Historia, Annales, Chronica. These words are at once titles of works and names of perceived genres, and this conjunction makes these words matter a great deal. We often do not know what titles medieval authors gave to works, nor sometimes even the titles works circulated under. But every item needs a label, and so contemporary scholarly practice gives every work an ad hoc title-label identical with the work's imagined literary genre. These genres are, then, the ordered literary realms in which we understand ancient, ambiguous textual entities to function (or have functioned). Our title-label-genres thus construct an associative web of like-titled works and so reiterate the preconceived genre from which each title arose. And so, modern titles of medieval works are primarily a cue from Scholar ›X‹ to Scholar ›Q‹ of the genre in which we read Work ›P‹; titles mark medievalists telling each other how to think about a work, and through this process we predetermine the comparative frame in which we read any text.
Once a work has a title it is extremely difficult to ›unthink‹ work from genre-title, especially acknowledging titles as established practices of scholarly reading: our understanding of ›His-tory‹, ›Annal‹, and ›Chronicle‹ have become the realms of possibility within which we permit works to matter. It is not only possible, but needful, to work ourselves out of this constricting feedback loop. Medievalists have insisted to each other that we should think about (medieval) chronicles differently from ›history‹, but how to do this at the level of genre has proven rather elusive. RB and MK's A Historical Introduction to the Chronicle Genre offers a significant step forward in this discussion and, as I have argued, by engaging with the authors' claims we can step even further. There is value in having more medievalists thinking about medieval chronicles as a genre stretching back into the ancient world, if only for the intellectual connections this would facilitate between scholars working on the innovative ways ancient authors portrayed their thinking about time, and knowledge. The stakes here are greater than field-specific. As we continue to wrestle with ideas like ›Global‹ and ›Deep‹ History, it would be worth reflecting on why, when our ancient and medieval cousins attempted parallel projects, they made a hard turn away from the investigative genre of historia; history-writing -whether ancient, late antique, early, central, or later medieval -limited itself to fields far smaller than the global. This is not to say that there were not attempts to encapsulate ›the world‹-a striking number of authors constructed a ›big past‹. But the great majority of ancient and medieval writers who considered human kind on a cosmological scale turned first to the issue of time, and produced chronica. Did Early Medieval authors realize that if they asked historia to contain the world, it would stretch and break? That the new wine would simply spill from the old skins? If nothing else, it seems appropriate to take a very critical look at the nature of our interest in ›worlding‹ the past. If we search for ›world history‹ without truly reconsidering ›world time‹, are we pursuing a methodological non sequitur?
At the least, we must back away from our conceptual standoff with the past; as Burgess and Kulikowski have shown, we must stop reading chronicles as histories, and start reading chronicles as chronicles. By my reckoning, the way towards this end must now also embrace an understanding of genre more concerned with the effects a text had upon its contemporary readers. To do this, we cannot obscure the slim evidence we have for how ›ancient‹ and ›me-dieval‹ people thought about the works they read. We cannot abandon evidence of how -for instance -people like Isidore of Seville attempted to distinguish terms such as »annals«, »history«, or »chronicle«.
The medievalist H. R. Jauss was quoted briefly above as expressing the concern that scholars see »the history of literary genres as a temporal process of the continual founding and altering of horizons«, a history which possesses enough dynamism to incorporate works that would completely upset the generic expectations at any given time. Jauss claimed that any such expectation-upsetting work must not be seen as a failure to its own genre, but as a dynamic and ingenious masterwork definable in terms of an alteration of the horizon of the genre that is as unexpected as it is enriching. … [Masterworks] may change with the history of their effects and later interpretations, and thereby may also differently illuminate the coherence of the history of their genre that is to be narrated.
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Whether or not Jauss' term ›masterwork‹ is the most appropriate is not central to my point here. The point is rather Jauss' enthusiasm for scholars to adopt comparative approaches that truly and honestly incorporate the possibility of understanding difference as ingenious creativity.
Cicero's Brutus provided us with a proposition of the effect which a chronicle ›master-work‹ might have been expected to produce: chronicles could offer a new encounter with time, an »alteration of the horizon«. Granting this, wouldn't we expect that, in order to continue making that same Ciceronian restoration-via-provocation, in order to translate the effect of the chronicle into new times and places, the tired, millennium-aged chronicle form would have to change? If a fundamental characteristic of a chronicle was to make a reader re-think their world by re-presenting time, would it not be necessary that five hundred years after Atticus' chronicle so surprised and delighted Cicero, a work seeking to portray time to the same effect would have to do so differently? Would the new, updated form not still be a ›chronicle‹ for its own day? In short: instead of viewing Isidore's Chronica and other similar ›medieval‹ works as failures of the Ancient Greek Chronicle genre, should we not view them as Jauss-ian »masterworks« extending that powerful genre with Eusebian brilliance? Let us adopt RB and MK's account, but with the altered hypothesis that medieval chronographers updated chronicles to »new horizons«. To provoke their readers to re-think time, successful chronicles re-invented the reckoning of time their readers took for granted.
77 Chronicles -to re-deploy one of RB and MK's conclusions -»had evolved«, and they were bound to keep evolving if only that they might persist in doing »their job«. 
